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In the 
upreme Court of the State of Utah 
rATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DW ARD E. McHENRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8756 
The defendant, Edward E. McHenry, was convicted on 
ne 29th day of April, 1957, of having committed the crime 
f robbery on the 16th day of February, 1957, in Salt Lake 
:ity. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
ndeterminate term. 
There is no question that a robbery was committed on 
he day and at the place alleged. The evidence admitted 
ndicated the following facts: That on the above mentioned 
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16th day of February, 1957, Wallace E. Naylor, Gener. 
Manager of the Safeway Store, located at 17th South an 
4th East, was robbed in the morning hours between 7:0 
and 8 :00 a. m. by two masked men, each carrying guru 
Their apparent means of entry was through a hole cut i: 
the roof. The questions raised on appeal go to the identifj 
cation of the defendant and to the admission of certaiJ 
evidence which it is alleged was prejudicial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A FORMER OFFENSE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE OWNER-
SHIP OF THE MERCURY AUTOMOBILE. 
POINT III. 
IF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
AUTOMOBILE WAS INADMISSIBLE, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT STATE-
MENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE TO 
POLICE OFFICERS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A FORMER OFFENSE. 
During the trial evidence of a previous crime com-
.tted at the same store five days earlier and under some-
lat similar circumstances was admitted over objection. 
was offered for the purpose of identifying the defendant. 
In the law of evidence it is a general rule that evidence 
a separate and independant crime is inadmissible to 
ove the guilt of a person on trial for a criminal offense. 
1ere are, however, several exceptions to the rule which 
e as uniformly accepted as the rule itself, one being that 
1ere evidence of a previous crime tends to aid in identify-
g the accused as the person who committed the crime in 
1estion, it is admissible even though it tends to show the . 
lilt of the accused of the other crime for which he is not 
. trial. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Vol. 
Sec. 181. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martin, (1917 
tab), 164 P. 500, a case cited in appellant's brief, recog-
zed the above rule and the exception thereto. The case is 
,t comparable factually and is therefore not analyzed 
~re. 
In overruling the defendant's objection to the admission 
evidence of the previous offense, the trial judge said at 
~ge 17 of the trial record : 
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled, but 
the Court will limit the effect of the evidence. 
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"Mr. Child has stated in his opening statem 
that the defendant was recognized by virtue oJ 
chance to observe him at the prior event, and : 
the purposes of identification the Court will let 
the evidence concerned an earlier robbery or en1 
into the store. 
"But you are not to assume-that is, consi£ 
that evidence for any purpose other than identifit 
tion of the person who entered on the 16th day 
February. The defendant is not being tried fort 
event that happened the week before. 
"But if that event assists somebody in identiJ 
ing him, the theory is that he was in once and S;J 
he was back again, and indicated he was the sat 
man, and if that is all connected up you may co 
sider it on the subject of identification." 
The evidence as admitted at trial made direct connectio 
in two instances between the offense of the 16th of Fe 
ruary, the offense charged, and the previous offense oft: 
11th of February, 1957. The 11th of February was a Mo 
day and the 16th a Saturday. Mr. Naylor, the robbe: 
victim, testified as to admissions made to him by the d 
fendant. See page 14 of the trial record. The witne~ 
after describing his arrival at the store and being accosu 
by the men, testified as follows : 
"They said, 'This time we are back for ever 
thing.'" 
And further, on the same page : 
"* * * the one fellow said 'We want all tl 
money this time.' He said, 'the last time you lit 
to us.'·· 
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is testimony was significant as indicating that the men 
nmitting the robbery on the 16th of February had prev-
1sly committed a robbery at the same place and in the 
~sence of this witness. Later in the trial Officer Fillis 
tified as to statements which the accused had made to 
n: 
"I asked him how many robberies he had com-
mitted. He stated 'The one today, and the one last 
Monday.'" 
lefendant objected but was overruled.) 
"A. His answer was two, 'the one today and 
the one last Monday.' 
"Q. Did you ask him specifically as to what 
robbery he meant as to last Monday? 
"A. I said, 'The Safeway store', and he said 
'Yes.'" 
e page 152 of the trial record. These admissions and con-
:;sions by the defendant, together with the similarity of 
e two offenses, constitute sufficient connection of the two 
fenses, and, therefore, furnish ground to admit evidence 
the former offense for the purpose of identifying the 
fend ant. 
In the New York decision of People v. Thau (1916 New 
>rk), 113 N. E. 556, a problem similar to the one at hand 
ts in issue. The defendant had been convicted of assault 
d evidence had been admitted at trial, over objection, that 
e defendant had, approximately two weeks previous, com-
itted a crime at the same location as the offense charged. 
te defense had been an alibi. The court said at page 557: 
"The defense of an alibi raised in the most di-
rect manner possible an issue as to the identity of 
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the person who assaulted the complainant on th~ 
15th of September. Any fact tending to show tha1 
the complainant was not mistaken in alleging tha1 
that person was the defendant was relevant to tha1 
issue. If the defendant to the knowledge of the com. 
plainant had visited his shop within a fortnight and 
had then criminally destroyed some of his goods, that 
fact would be likely so to impress the mind of the 
complainant as to lessen the probability that he was 
mistaken concerning the identity of his assailant on 
the 15th of September. * * *" 
In People v. Stathas (1934 Illinois), 190 N. E. 661, two 
defendants were convicted of having robbed a bank on 
August 18, 1932. Two bank employees testified that they 
had seen the defendants enter the bank. They were able 
to identify the defendants in the courtroom. Both employ-
ees further testified that they recognized the defendants 
as being the persons who robbed the bank on May 25, 1932, 
three months prior to the date of the offense charged. The 
identity of the defendants became a prime issue. The fol-
lowing is quoted from the court's opinion : 
"It is urged that the testimony of the cashier 
and his brother tended to show a distinct, substan-
tive offense committed by one or both of the defen-
dants on May 25, and that the admission of such 
evidence was therefore improper and very prejudi-
cial to the defendants' case. The general rule is that 
evidence of a distinct, unrelated crime is not admis-
sible upon the trial of a defendant charged with the 
commission of a criminal offense. There is, however, 
an exception to this rule generally recognized by the 
courts and text-writers. Such exception is that, when 
the evidence offered tends to prove the identity of 
the person who committed the crime for which he is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
on trial, or that he was present at and where the 
crime was committed, such evidence is competent. 
Such evidence is also proper to meet or rebut the 
defense of alibi. The rule deducible from the author-
ities is that, if such evidence is material and rele-
vant, even though it tends to prove the perpetration 
of another unrelated and separate criminal offense 
on the part of a defendant, the court may properly 
receive such testimony. * * *" 
In Warren v. State (1941 Tenn.), 156 S. W. 2d 416, 
e court has stated the general rule regarding the admis-
m of evidence of a previous offense. The case involved 
robbery where the issue of identification was raised. The 
urt said: 
"The general rule that evidence of separate and 
independent crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt 
of a person upon trial for a criminal offense is sub-
ject to a well-defined exception with respect to proof 
of the identity of the accused. The broad rule is that 
where evidence tends to aid in identifying the ac-
cused as the person who committed the particular 
crime under investigation, it is admissible, in spite 
of the fact that it tends to show that the accused is 
guilty of other crimes for which he is not on trial. 
This rule is applied in a wide variety of cases, such 
as arson, burglary, homicide, larceny, liquor law 
violations, robbery, and many other instances. It is 
permissible, in those instances where evidence is 
admitted of the commission of another similar crime 
for the purpose of showing identity, for the accused 
to introduce in evidence the record of a court show-
ing his trial and acquittal of such other crime. 
* * *" 
:e also People v. Thompson (1950 Ill.), 94 N. E. 2d 349. 
tere is an extensive annotation at 42 A. L. R. 2d 862, re-
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lating to the admissibility in robbery prosecutions of evi-
dence of other robberies. 
It is important to note that in this case the problem 
of identity was of great importance. The two individuals 
who committed the robbery wore masks during all of the 
time they were observed by the victim. Five days previous 
two masked persons had entered this same store and com-
mitted the crime of robbery. There were strong indications, 
above recited, that the same persons committed both crimes. 
It was therefore necessary that evidence of the previous 
crime be used for the purposes of identification. 
Any misunderstanding on the part of the jury as to the 
effect of the evidence of the previous crime was cured by 
the court's statement in overruling the objection, above 
quoted, and in the court's Instruction No. 5E. 
"You are instructed that evidence has been in-
troduced in this case concerning a robbery alleged 
to have taken place on the 11th day of February, 
1957, which was allegedly committed by the defen-
dant, Edward E. McHenry, on the person and prop-
erty of Wallace E. Naylor and Oliver M. Nickel. 
Said evidence is not to be considered by you as show-
ing or tending to show that the defendant, Edward 
E. McHenry, robbed Wallace E. Naylor on the 16th 
day of February, 1957, but can only be used by you 
in determining the manner of the identification of 
the said Edward E. McHenry by the said Oliver M. 
Nickel and Wallace E. Naylor." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE OWNER-
SHIP OF THE MERCURY AUTOMOBILE. 
In appellant's brief, Point 2, it is argued that evidence 
concerning the ownership of a Mercury automobile was in-
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rnissible. Officer Burton, testifying for the state, related 
l cricumstances of his discovering, shortly after the time 
the robbery, a 1957 Mercury automobile, a short distance 
>m the Safeway store. Over the objection that the evi-
nce was hearsay, he was allowed to testify that the car 
d "temporary stickers" bearing the name of the defen-
nt. See trial record, pages 129 and 130. The testimony is 
:o related on pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief. 
Appellant asserts that this evidence was hearsay and 
~refore inadmissible. There are two approaches to this 
oblem. The officer's testimony in relating that he saw 
~ sticker and testifying as to the name thereon is not a 
)lation of the hearsay rule. In Section 249, Wharton's 
iminal Evidence, 12th Edition, it is stated: 
"If the witness makes a statement on the basis 
of his own observations and not because he was told 
or informed by another person, his statement is not 
hearsay. Thus, it is not hearsay for the coroner 
who had performed the autopsy on the body to state 
whether there was any kind of tag on the body at 
the time he performed the autopsy, since the pres-
ence or absence of a tag was a fact which he would 
know of his own observations." 
condly, the evidence as to the sticker and name thereon 
:ty be admitted as a public record; therefore, an exception 
the hearsay rule. The Officer testified that the car was 
1ew 1957 model and that it had "temporary stickers." The 
nporary stickers he referred to are "temporary permits" 
ovided for in the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, Section 41-1-18, 
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U. C. A. 1953, providing for the registration of a new auto-
mobile. Section 41-1-18 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or 
move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be 
driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle of 
a type required to be registered hereunder which 
is not registered or for which a certificate of title 
has not been issued or applied for, or for which the 
apropriate fee has not been paid when and as re-
quired hereunder, except that when application ac-
companied by proper fee has been made for regis-
tration and certificate of title for a vehicle it may 
be operated temporarily pending complete registra-
tion upon displaying a temporary permit duly veri-
fied, or other evidence of such application, or other-
wise under rules and regulations promulgated by 
the commission." (Emphasis added.) 
A "temporary permit" required by the act to be displayed 
is in the nature of an official or public document. It is a 
general rule that a record made for public use is admissible 
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule as 
evidence of the truth of the statements therein made. See 
Section 272, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition. 
It has frequently been held that names, tags, license 
numbers, etc., attached to property may be admitted as 
raising a presumption of ownership of the property. "Thus, 
the name or number marked on a shop, a ship, a railroad 
car, or other chattel or structure may be admissible to show 
that person's ownership or control." Section 150a, Wigmore 
on Evidence, 3rd Edition. It is a general rule that the fact 
that an automobile was registered in a person's name, or 
that it bore his license plates at a certain time creates a 
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resumption that he was the owner. See Annotation in 103 
. L. R. 138. In the Utah case, Ferguson v. Reynolds 
1918), 176 P. 267, an action for injuries caused by an 
1tomobile striking the plaintiff. The court had before it 
te question of the ownership of the automobile that caused 
te injury. Evidence had been offered identifying the 
1tomobile by the license number it bore. The court com-
lented on the existing Utah law requiring the owners of 
lOtor vehicles to register the same with the Secretary of 
tate. The court said at page 267 : 
"Defendants' counsel insist that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the verdict. In this connec-
tion, counsel contend that the applications made to 
and filed with the Secretary of State are not suffi-
cient to establish the ownership of the car. We are 
unable to conceive why our statute was adopted if 
it was not for the purpose of furnishing at least 
prima facie evidence of the ownership of motor ve-
hicles. * * * We think the courts generally 
hold that the applications and numbers or certifi-
cates issued under statutes like ours constitute prima 
facie evidence that the applicant is the owner of the 
vehicle which is identified in the application. Under 
our statute the number issued to one owner may not 
be transferred, nor, in case the vehicle is sold to 
another, can the number be transferred to the trans-
feree. Nor can the number issued for one vehicle be 
transferred to another vehicle. If therefore the per-
son making the application for registry is found 
using the vehicle described in the application and 
which bears the number issued by the Secretary of 
State for such vehicle, it certainly constitutes some 
substantial evidence that such person is the owner 
of the vehicle so described and which bears such 
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number. * * * In Berry, Automobiles (2d Ed) 
§ 609, the author, in referring to this subject, says: 
" 'Evidence that the automobile which caused 
the plaintiff's injuries displayed a certain license 
number, and that this number was registered in the 
office of the Secretary of State in the defendant's 
name as owner, makes out a prima facie case of 
ownership in the defendant.'" 
Here the Mercury automobile was new and, therefore, had 
the temporary permits as required by statute. In such case 
it is only reasonable to apply the same rule as in situations 
where identification is made by way of a license number. 
On this point appellant relies heavily on a recent Utah 
case, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg 
(Utah), 315 P. 2d 277. The facts of that case are clearly 
distinguishable from the circumstances relating to the iden-
tification of the automobile here. There the court was 
faced with the problem of whether a sample of blood taken 
to determine alcoholic content was the same blood taken 
from the defendant on a previous occasion. There the prob-
lem of identity was of extreme importance because of the 
likelihood of confusing one test tube of blood for another, 
and because the blood might be handled and examined by 
any number of persons within the hospital or laboratory. 
Here the "sticker" on the automobile is similar to a license 
plate on a car or a tag on luggage. When attached to prop-
erty of this nature, the tag, plate, or sticker raises the 
presumption of ownership. 
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POINT III. 
IF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
AUTOMOBILE WAS INADMISSIBLE, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that the com-
mission of error by the trial court will not be presumed to 
have resulted in prejudice, and that a cause will not be 
reversed for error unless that error effects the substantial 
rights of the party. See also, State v. Neal (1953), 262 P. 
2d 756, and State v. Jttstensen, 99 P. 456. Even in the ab-
sence of testimony relating to the automobile, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defen-
dant. This court has held that the erroneous admission of 
evidence does not call for reversal of the judgment where 
the guilt of the accused is otherwise satisfactorily proved. 
State v. Cox, 276 P. 166. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT STATE-
MENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE TO 
POLICE OFFICERS. 
As to this problem, it is necessary to relate from the 
record the circumstances of the interrogation. See Trial 
Record, pages 149 through 155. The crime was committed 
at about 7:30 to 8:00 in the morning and the defendant was 
apprehended almost immediately afterwards and taken di-
rectly to the interrogation office of the Police Department. 
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There, in the presence of two police officers, one of whom 
testified at the trial, he was questioned. The police officer 
witness testified that the interrogators were identified as 
police officers; that the defendant was informed that he 
was under arrest; that he had the right to counsel, and 
that anything he said might be used against him. See page 
151 of the Trial Record. Thereafter, upon inquiry, the de-
fendant stated that he had committed the robbery that day 
and the previous robbery on the Monday before. 
Appeal is made on two grounds. First, that there was 
no foundation laid for the admission of the confession; and, 
second, that the confession was not voluntary. 
The evidence as to time and place and that defendant 
was advised of his rights serve as sufficient foundation. 
This court, in the case of State v. Crank, (1943 Utah), 142 
P. 2d 178, where the question of the admissibility of a con-
fession was raised, said at page 185: 
"* * * In laying a foundation for offering 
the writing, if a written confession, or the conversa-
tion, if an oral confession, the state will of course 
be required to show the time and place of the con-
versation, or the writing and signing of the instru-
ment, and also what is generally called a prima facie 
showing that it was the free and voluntary act of 
the accused. * * *" 
The prosecutor satisfied the requirements of laying a foun-
dation as above prescribed; the time and place were shown. 
That defendant was advised of his rights and that there 
was no evidence of compulsion or coercion suffices as a 
prima facie showing of voluntariness. 
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The extent of the compulsion or coercion applied in 
obtaining the confession as alleged by appellant is quoted 
from the Trial Record on pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief. 
The quoted testimony is found on pages 152, 153 and 160 
of the Trial Record. The issue of the voluntariness of a 
confession has been dealt with extensively by this court. 
In State v. Johnson (1938 Utah), 83 P. 1010, it was said: 
"* * * In determining whether a confession 
was voluntary there must be taken into considera-
tion the age and intelligence of the witness, the 
place and conditions under which the statement was 
made, the circumstances that invoked the conversa-
tion, as well as the nature, content, and import of the 
statement itself. The court held the statement vol-
untary and we find no error therein. 
"'A confession is involuntary where the installa-
tion of fear or a promise of benefit, related to the 
legal consequences as regards accused, conveyed by 
another for the purpose of obtaining the confession, 
has so acted on the will of the confessor as to fetter 
the freedom of choice on the matter of whether he 
or she should confess. The actuating element which 
must move the will of the accused to confess is an 
inherent freedom of choice not influenced by fear 
or hope induced by another for the purpose of ob-
taining the confession. Whether such freedom of 
choice has been so interfered with by the conduct of 
another is a question of fact to be determined from 
the evidence.' We think the trial court is in a better 
position to determine whether advantage was taken 
of a defendant to obtain a confession in a way not 
countenanced by the law. * * *" 
In this case the circumstances surrounding defendant's 
confession do not show an atmosphere of coercion or com-
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pulsion. Defendant was questioned immediately after he 
was apprehended. He was advised of his rights to counsel 
and that anything he said might be used against him. The 
questioning was extremely brief and it appears from the 
trial record that defendant made his statements in response 
to the officer's first inquiry. Defendant's claim that the 
confession was inadmissible is apparently based on a state-
ment which Officer Fillis is alleged to have made at the 
time of the interrogation. (Pages 152 and 153, Trial Rec-
ord.) Appellant's brief, pages 6 and 7, quoting from the 
trial record, contain this discussion and Officer Fillis' 
statement. Further on, in re-direct examination of the 
officer, his explanation of what he meant by the statement 
is related. See page 160 of the trial record. The statement 
of the officer, even if misunderstood, is not of such a threat-
ening nature as to have reasonably caused the defendant 
to fear and confess. Defendant did not testify that he was 
put in fear or that he understood the statement to be a 
threat. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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